This spectacular voluntarism which was to lead the colonized people in a single move to absolute sovereignty, the certainty one had that all the pieces of the nation could be gathered up in one fell swoop and from the same, shared perspective, and the strength grounded in this hope, have proved in the light of experience to be a very great weakness. (Frantz Fanon, 2004: 88)

Introduction

In a 2018 interview, former Kosovar PM Albin Kurti noted on the peculiar political situation of his country that they lacked ‘independence from independence’ (Kurti, 2018). This might at first sound counterintuitive, but is really referring to the fact that Kosovo is stuck in between formal independence and international recognition, locked in hostilities with Serbia and a precarious negotiation with the European Union (EU). Although Kurti and his party, Vetëvendosje (i), acknowledges the strategic importance of attaining sovereignty, they do little to conceal their belief that the international presence and the imposition of EU institutions is a form of oppression. Perhaps the most salient symbol of antagonism is the continued use by Vetëvendosje and their followers of the Albanian flag with its black eagle on a red background over the ‘neutral’ official one, with the colours of the EU. Kosovo presents much more than an ideological clash between market liberalism and nationalism but is instead a story of two different understandings of how a state comes into existence. It poses an odd challenge to a very fundamental building block of our understanding of the modern world, that of sovereignty. It is the question of sovereignty, scrutinised through the case of Kosovo, which is the central theme of this essay. 
         Sovereignty, generally understood as a distinct way of organizing the political entity of the nation-state, has in most social sciences been credited to the unique historical development of Europe, with the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648 carrying near mythological status (Periimäe, 2010). Yet despite the criticism launched against the overt European logic driving this narrative, it continues to live on, amorphously, as an empty signifier, ready to be filled with whatever meaning necessitated to give order to the discourse in which it has been invoked. It can take the form of a Weberian, rational form of governance, including a direct spatial logic upheld by a monopoly of violence (Krasniqi, 2019). It can be a form of dislodging of pre-existent modes of being, a subversion of local customs in the face of capitalist expansion, reminiscent of what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari would call de- and reterritorialization (1987). Or it can be the endpoint of a decolonial struggle, although Frantz Fanon would have us tread carefully, lest the popular struggle be subverted by a bourgeoisie nationalist agenda (2004). No matter how we decide to treat sovereignty, it is clear that one must regard it as a concept without clear definition.
 While all of these understandings have their own merits and drawbacks, I argue, instead, that we have to look at sovereignty as a form of practice; a practice that is informed by a mythical narrative which in itself structures the discourse of inclusion/exclusion into the sphere of existence in the realm of states. It is important to note here, myth should not be branded a historical inaccuracy, but instead as a distinct temporal structure within discourses, which provides an affective dimension. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, drawing on Lacanian psychoanalysis, name this affective dimension a fantasmatic logic. In other words, if a discourse is the organization of our thoughts and knowledge systems, the myth, or fantasy, is what sells that particular discourse to the audience.
But how, then, can we observe this in the political realm? How can we understand the myth of sovereignty, not just as theoretical musings, but as a concrete, political form of articulation? This is where one must look upon the current situation in Kosovo. Since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2010, Kosovo has been stuck in a categorical limbo on the threshold between independence and the international recognition needed for formal sovereignty. Politically it is governed by several international bodies; economically it is, as Vjosa Musliu (2019) argues, oddly suspended between a liberal market economy and its socialist past, and religiously it is predominantly Muslim (at odds with the Christian values of Europe). Indeed, the entire Balkans is referred to by Maria Todorova as a corridor, or a crossroads, neither Occident nor Orient but on the border between them (Todorova, 2009: 31/57-59).
 With this as our starting point, it would seem that the slightly Manichean division between East and West can be prodded. All of these antagonisms and crevices, these challenges to one dominant understanding of what and where Kosovo is, open for a deconstruction of two major myths in the making of a sovereign Kosovo: the neo-liberal, inclusionary myth of the European Union and the counter-hegemonic myth of unification with Albania. However, before we delve into the case of Kosovo, there are some theoretical underpinnings which require elucidation. The next section delves into an understanding of discourse, especially drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, and expands on the meaning of myth.
 
 
Discourse and Myth

The concept of discourse drawn upon in this essay, is largely indebted to the post-Marxist theories of Laclau and Mouffe, particularly as formulated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (2001). Fundamentally, discourse consists of an assembly of signifiers, which creates the social and political world that we inhabit. The meaning of signifiers is momentarily fixed through articulation and related to nodal points (or privileged signifiers). One understands these signifiers and nodal points as negative, in that what gives them meaning is the relational difference to other symbols. Through a constant discursive struggle, these nodal points are linked together into chains of equivalence, aiming at gaining a hegemonic position over other discourses, thus fixing meaning. Interestingly, the exclusion is exactly what makes discourse, and in extension, meaning itself, unstable and prone to change. What dictates the natural understanding of the world, is dependent on which discourse has won this struggle, excluded (albeit momentarily) all other forms of meaning, and asserted itself as hegemonic.
         Accepting such an account of discursivity would imply that the liminal position of Kosovo is conditional on the existence of a hegemonic discourse of the being of a state and, perhaps more importantly, what is excluded. In the language of Laclau and Mouffe, sovereignty as a form of nodal point must be fixed in any state-building discourse. For example, in the era after the end of the Cold War, the hegemonic discourse can generally be identified as neo-liberal democratic and Westphalian, as opposed to authoritarian and Communist (Musliu & Orbie, 2014: 181; Campbell, 1992: 236).
         What is given less attention in this theory of discourse is the temporal aspect. In this case: not how to be a state, but how to become a state. It is clear that no single definition of sovereignty can be pinned, but it is contingent on what discourse achieves hegemony. Yet, a relatively under-examined part of Laclau and Mouffe’s framework, is the concept of fantasy, borrowed from psychoanalysis. It is the promise that the subject, which, due to the unstable nature of discourse, can somehow reach fullness-- a promise with which the subject can identify. It is, in other words, a form of fantasmatic horizon, for which the subject strives. This would ineludibly imply a temporal logic; the striving itself necessitates a standpoint in time, in between the future and the past from which it emerges. Stengel and Nabers summarise it thus: “This is the mythical element of any hegemonic project, as it functions as an incarnation of a fully constituted “perfect society” that cannot really ever be reached” (2019: 259).
         A myth, as suggested earlier, is therefore not a historical inaccuracy, but a narrative which weaves together these distinct signifiers (or nodal points), infusing them with a temporal order that allows actors to make sense of their longing, thus creating a meaningful structure to their actions (Münch, 2016: 52-53; Žižek, 1993: 202). For the sake of analysis, this narrative has been divided into three temporal phases. Typically, myth is perceived as a story of genesis, or how a group or society was created. This is what Chiara Botticci refers to as a form of primordial chaos (2007: 121). She herself gives the example of how WWII served as a trauma which served as a foundational and common platform from which the EU was created. However, myth operates not just on the axis of past-present, or present-future, but involves all three stages. If there is a fantasmatic horizon, a future which the subject strives for, which stands in relation to the chaos from which it emerges, myth functions on the tension in between these two points, making sense only in the present.
         Previously, Kosovo has been referred to as existing in a liminal position, a concept from the work of Victor Turner, and subsequently Jacques Derrida. It refers to the condition of a subject, engaged in the process of a ritual, wherein they are suspended between the pre-ritual stage and the final stage. ‘Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony’ (Turner, 1969: 95). He goes on to say that: ‘The initiand, in a state of liminality, is sexless, ontologically in between all forms of being. [They] must submit to the authority of the “total community” […] they must be a tabula rasa, upon which knowledge is inscribed.’ (Turner, 1969: 102-103). This ontologically precarious subject position, the idea of being tabula rasa, is exactly whereupon the myth works. It is here that the tension between the pre-communitarian chaos and the fantasmatic horizon, full of promises, can shape the political reality of subjects. It is by weaving a distinct narrative, as a part of a larger discourse which naturalises the way that a state shall come into existence, that the myths of sovereignty at play in Kosovo can be understood.
 
 
The Myth of European Sovereignty

Kosovo, a landlocked country with a majority Albanian ethnic population, was pre-independence an autonomous province within the Yugoslav republic of Serbia. Zupančič and Pejič suggest that the Kosovar student protests of 1981 was the starting point of the escalation of tension, which would lead to Slobodan Milošević’s attempt to re-integrate Kosovo into Serbia in 1989 (2018: 41). This event is often credited with sparking the Yugoslav wars. Once NATO decided to intervene in the ongoing Serb invasion of Kosovo in 1999, they presented an ultimatum in the form of the Rambouillet Accords claiming that the ongoing conflict was incompatible with the democratic peace ideal, the yardstick of a proper European state. This was to be the first instance of Western intervention based on the notion of ‘R2P’ and an unprecedented display of force by NATO.
         There is an antagonism here between the Western values enshrined in the liberal, democratic peace ideal which arose as a response to the trauma of WWII, and the bloody conflict in the Balkans. The instance of violence at the very borders of the EU stood opposed to the developing discourse of ‘human rights’, as well as the economic stability of the region. The latter is important for two particular reasons: firstly, this happened only a short time after the end of the Cold War – the ultimate symbolic clash between communism and capitalism, East and West – while Yugoslavia remained neutral, making it the sole communist state to develop economic ties to the EEC (what would eventually become the EU) (EEC, 1990). Secondly, it adds a distinct functionalist logic to the European discourse. The functionalist logic is important, because it subverts the meaning of stability, by suggesting that it is based on a very specific rationale. It is an argument which has been reiterated throughout much literature on the genesis of the EU— that is only through economic integration of functional sectors, could stability be established, and future war prevented.
         Once emerging from the primordial chaos that was the Yugoslav conflict, Kosovo found itself in a precarious political situation. Much of the economic infrastructure was still based on the Yugoslav model of planned economy, meaning that much of the industry was owned by the state. The country’s constitution was more or less a direct copy of the Ahtisaari Plan (2007), a document in cooperation with several international bodies, including a steering group appointed by the EU. Several international missions (sent by the UN, the EU and NATO) were present, governing different sectors in Kosovo. In essence, Kosovo was a state of ‘international design’ (Bose, 2005: 322). While the political status was (and largely still is) undetermined, it is clear that one of the primary issues for the EU is privatisation.
         This in many ways speaks to the liminal position of Kosovo. It is suspended, as Vjosa Musliu says, between its socialist past and integration into the European neo-liberal market economy (2019). Furthermore, despite former Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini stressing the shared history and culture, claiming that the only hindrance to an increased freedom of movement between Kosovo and the EU was a matter of technicalities (EC, 2018a), visa liberalisation is still an outstanding matter. How then, to end this seeming state of suspension? How to bring Kosovo from the darkness of the “primordial chaos” and towards the “fantasmatic horizon?
As argued, Kosovo has progressed from a position of chaos to become a liminal space between planned and market economy. Furthermore, it exists inside and outside of Europe in terms of borders. With visa liberalisation yet unsolved, it begs the question of what potential ‘inclusion’ the EU has to offer. It is here necessary to emphasise the spatial aspect. Continued diplomatic tension between Serbia and Kosovo led former President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker to state “if this dispute between Serbia and Kosovo is not resolved there will be no chance whatsoever for Serbia and Kosovo to become members of the EU. We do not want to import instability in the Union, we want to export stability” (European Western Balkans, 2019).
         This stability is clearly achieved through applying what is referred to as the ‘European Perspective’ which promotes good neighbourly relations and economic development (EC, 2018b). Evidently, there is an echo here of how stability and economics serve under a rational, functionalist logic. There is, in other words, no room in the EU for states that do not conform to this logic, while the same logic is what is being promised. In the words of Karl Eide, former in a report to Kofi Annan:
 
While privatization is widely considered as the centrepiece of the UNMIK economic policy, it still remains only a part of economic development and certainly is not a panacea. It will not produce positive changes in the short term […] However, privatization has become a symbolic issue and a sign of unfulfilled promises by UNMIK. The privatization process should move forward effectively without delay’ (Eide, 2004: 18, my emphasis).
 
The European sovereignty is thus less about territorial integrity, as it once was, but is rather governed by a market liberal and functionalist logic. In other words: privatisation is a prerequisite for integration into the EU, and it is at the same time only through integration that said stability can be attained.
 
The Myth of Albanian Sovereignty

While the conflict with Serbia was no doubt an important part in the genesis of a Kosovar identity, the primordial chaos needs to be identified as part of a much longer process. Ever since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Kosovo has continuously been under the suzerainty of neighbouring powers. Yet, despite the state-building projects during the 20th century of the major European powers, a fully independent and ethnically united Kosovo was never created, with its territories instead divided between the neighbouring Balkan countries (Janssens, 2015: 52). The lack of a cohesive geographical space for Albanians in the Balkans means that there is a constant external threat, against which they have identified themselves first and foremost as ethnically Albanian, before citizens of a specific state. As Albin Kurti puts it in an interview given shortly after being elected Prime Minister: ‘[…] I am first [a] citizen of [the] republic. Only when Belgrade comes into this political, and geopolitical, equation, I re-become Albanian, to successfully resist different hegemonic aspirations that they have’ (Kurti, 2018).
         In contrast to the European myth which started with Kosovo’s ‘bloody’ and ‘barbaric’ socialist past (Zupančič & Pejič, 2018: 34), this myth takes its starting point in the failure of the international society to ensure a distinct space for Albanians. The trauma lies primarily in the way that external aggression unremittingly forces Albanians to ‘re-become’ Albanians. Despite the declaration of independence being found judicially legitimate by the International Court of Justice in 2010, the status of Kosovo remains outstanding. Sovereignty is thus seemingly suspended between independence from Serbia, and their inability to either join the EU, or enter into a confederation with Albania. The latter is stated in Kosovo’s constitution, article 1.3, which reads: ‘The Republic of Kosovo shall have no territorial claims against, and shall seek no union with, any State or part of any State’ (Constitution of Kosovo, 2020). In contrast, article 1.1 states that: ‘The Republic of Kosovo is an independent, sovereign, democratic, unique and indivisible state’ (Constitution of Kosovo, 2020).
         It is exactly this that Kurti refers to when he claims that Kosovo lacks ‘independence from independence’. In the face of such an institutional stalemate, it is no wonder that the Albanian flag has become a major symbol of resistance for Kosovo Albanians, and members of Vetëvendosje. After all, the official flag of Kosovo was made on the conditions that it neither resembled the flag of Albania nor portrayed the tricolour of Serbia (Kosovo Unity Team, 2007). The cultural-symbolic order enforced by the West, exemplified in the neutral EU flag, suggests a form of sterilisation of Kosovan history, as it neither represents the Albanian people, their culture nor their history. In effect, the symbol of Kosovo itself becomes suspended between the two previous constitutive entities, just as the republic itself is trapped in its own independence.
         Independence, particularly in the discourse of Vetëvendosje, signifies the democratic choice of the people to enter into foreign relations with other states, of their own volition. Although it is primarily articulated as a question of possible unification with Albania, it becomes a demand for sovereignty through the agency granted by the very process of unification. Here, sovereignty itself becomes a signifier for agency, the ability to, without the meddling of foreign powers, rule itself. The fantasmatic aspect of this myth, is thus phrased less in terms of achieving a certain political status, as much as the emancipatory act of doing so.
According to a poll conducted in 2010, which measured support for the creation of a Greater Albanian state, 62% in Albania, 81% in Kosovo, and 51.9% in Northern Macedonia, were in favour of such a project (Balkan Insight, 2010). Unification, as opposed to any form of border correction or internationally brokered deal, is framed as a question of the bottom-up will of the people (EP, 2018; Kurti, 2018). A sovereign Kosovo can only be truly sovereign in its ability to at once deny its own existence through reunion with Albania. This is where the true liminality becomes apparent: there is a decisive moment of existing ‘ontologically in between all forms of being’ as Victor Turner states, and it is the promise of an ethno-state which welds together the chain of equivalence in this particular discourse.
 
Conclusion

The aim of this essay has been less to give an account of what sovereignty can mean in specific contexts, as much as to suggest how it can be deconstructed as a form of mythical narrative. While the epistemic hegemony of the European, neo-liberal state as signifying sovereignty can be assumed, it is a concept that is perhaps more precarious than often assumed. It is built upon a chain of equivalence, where important nodal points are market liberalisation and stability. Although the case of Kosovo might not be radically different, the articulation of agency and ethnic unity across borders, proves counter-hegemonic. It suggests a different narrative of how a state can become. Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests that one way of challenging the epistemic hegemony of the ‘hyperreal’ Europe, is to ‘provincialize it’ (2000). It is about finding alternative histories of existing modes of being and resisting. While the ontological core of the Albanian myth might not be a total break with a European way of thinking, it does attempt to subvert it, challenging the breaks and inconsistencies in the façade.
         Sovereignty, then, is perhaps less a concrete destination of a political struggle, but a way of articulating the fantasmatic aspects of said struggle. One could of course locate myths everywhere, in every political struggle, and one might then ask oneself: what is the point? Is political mythography merely a descriptive form of methodological acrobatics? On one hand, yes. But it has also become normative, exactly by challenging rigid forms of knowledge, concepts that are largely taken for granted and enshrined in international law articulated by the same Western powers which once disseminated the very concept of the nation-state itself, through means of colonisation and warfare. This essay might not decolonise the notion of sovereignty, or even pose a serious challenge to it. But hopefully, it can be a tentative step towards a future methodology which can do just that.
 
 
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This essay is a partly reworked version of a BA thesis written and submitted by the author in 2020 to Malmö University. Some parts are taken directly from the thesis.

(i) Albanian for ‘Self-determination’